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CASE NOTES
PAWNEE WELL USERS V. WOLFE: THE
NATURAL SUCCESSOR TO VANCE V. WOLFE
JOHNA VARTY'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the Colorado Supreme Court created a stir in the energy
and water communities when it issued its decision in Vance v. Wolfe. In
Vance, the court held that water produced during the coalbed methane
("CBM") extraction process constituted a "beneficial use" of that water,
thus subjecting it to administration by the Colorado State engineer
("SEO" or "state engineer").' While the underlying facts in Vance related to methane gas produced from coal seams, the resulting rulemaking
process had implications for oil and natural gas producers throughout the
state.2 As a result, the oil and gas industry saw the decision as an additional regulatory hurdle that would significantly increase the costs and
uncertainty of both CBM and conventional forms of oil and gas production ("conventional development"). 4 Landowners and water right holders concerned with water quality and the security of their water rights applauded the court's decision as an appropriate step toward further protecting their water interests. 5
Following the Vance decision, the SEO faced the staggering reality
that that thousands of oil and gas wells in the State would require permitting determinations.' The Colorado Legislature ("Legislature") stepped
in to provide a streamlined process by which the SEO could proceed with

* With thanks to Jason Turner, Colorado River Water Conservation District,
for
his review and commentary.
1. Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1169 (Colo. 2009).
2. Cody Doig, Vance v. Wolfe: "BenelicialUse" or "BeneficialByproduct?"- An
Analysis of Produced Water in Colorado, 13 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 163, 173 (2009).
3. For the purposes of this Note, I will use "conventional development" to mean all
forms of non-conventional oil and gas production other than CBM. These type of production include, but are not limited to, conventional associated gas, gas-rich shale, and
conventional non-associated gas.
4. Id.
5. Neal Joseph Valorz, The Need for Codification of Wyoming's Coal Bed Methane Produced GroundwaterLaws, 10 WYo. L. REV. 115, 124 (2010).
6. Kristin H. Mosely, Produced Water Associated with Shale Gas Development, *1,
*4 (Feb. 24, 2012)(unpublished comment, on file with the University of Denver Water
Law Review).
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making these determinations.' The resulting legislation provided a process by which the SEO could make basin-wide determinations over
whether the water being produced was tributary or nontributary in nature.' The legislation further clarified that for both CBM and conventional development, any tributary groundwater produced would require a
permit, and if taken from an over-appropriated stream system, require a
court-approved augmentation plan. 9 The Legislature further declared
that for conventional production, groundwater extracted from nontributary sources would not require a permit unless that water was being put to
a )eneficial use.io CBM production of nontributary groundwater stayed
See Figure 1.0 for a general
true to Vance, and required a permit."
breakdown of how each type of well is now administered.

Nontributary
Conventional

Tributary Con-

No

No

(unless put to beneficial
use as defined by § 3790-137(7))
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ventional

Yes
(if over-appropriated)

Figure 1.12

Opponents of oil and gas development, concerned landowners including the plaintiffs in Vance, and environmental groups opposed the
basin-wide determinations and challenged the laws in court. The resulting case, Pawnee Well Users v. Wolfe, challenged the scope of the SEO's
administrative authority and process, claiming that the Legislature did not
grant the SEO the authority to make basin-wide determinations, and that
the public was not given sufficient due process.1

7.

2009 CO H.B. 1303; 2010 CO S.B. 165.

8.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 (2011); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(4)
(granting the state engineer authority to issue pernits for non-tributary wells); COLo.
REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5)(defining "nontributary").
10.

10.
11.

Id.
Id.
Id.

12. Kent Holsinger, Produced Water from Oil and Gas: The Legal and Regulatory
Framework, presentation (powerpoint at 138) (on file with author).
13. Pawnee Well Isers v. Wolfe, No. 2010CW98 (Water Div. 1 2011).
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This Note examines Pawnee as an inevitable outgrowth of Vance.
The first section will discuss the basic geology and hydrology associated
with CBM development and the differences between it and conventional
production. Second, this Note will analyze the Vance decision. Third,
this Note will address the changes the Legislature made to the regulatory
scheme both during after Vance in order to incorporate the Vance decision into the SEO's rulemaking jurisdiction and streamline the resulting
process. Fourth, this Note will look at Pawnee as the inevitable result of
the Vance decision and the Legislature's actions. Last, this Note will discuss some future policy implication of the Vance and Pawneedecisions.
II.

WHAT IS CBM AND HOW IS IT DIFFERENT FROM CONVENTIONAL

OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT?
CBM is quite different from conventional development and results in
different extraction techniques. CBM is found in shallow underground
seams, generally at depths between 1,000 and 3,000 feet.14 Comparatively, conventional oil and gas, while occasionally just as shallow as
CBM, is commonly much deeper-with some wells over 8,000 feet below
the surface."s Biological processes iii these coal seams generate methane
gas that is held in place by the hydrostatic pressure of naturally occurring
groundwater also found within the coal seams.' 6 Therefore, in order to
release the methane, producers must first dewater the coal formation.
Once the water is removed, the methane is no longer trapped by hydrostatic pressure and can be extracted.1 8 The water produced is then disposed of in a variety of ways including stored in lined storage tanks followed by re-injection, stock watering, irrigation, stock watering, or release
into dry stream channels.19 While there has been a trend towards recycling this water, it is often more cost efficient to re-inject the water into
geologically isolated formations well below the surface and any aquifers
containing usable water supplies.20 The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC") regulates access to and activities in these
formations, as well as the reinjection process, and the storage and recycling process.21
While there are formations where conventional oil and gas can be extracted much closer to the surface, generally, the comparatively shallower

14. Joseph Michael Evers, Coalbed Methane: Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Project, Nat. Res. Law Center, University of Colorado Law School, available at
http://www.oilandgasbnps.org/resources/cbm.php.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Vance, 205 P.3d at 1167.
20. Mosely, supra note 6 at *34.
21. Vance, 205 P.3d at 1167.
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depth of CBM production is more likely to pump tributary groundwater
than conventional production.22 See e.g. Figure 2.0.

Schematic geology of natural gas resources
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F rure 2.0 23
In the case of conventional deposits, there are often intermediate layers of nonporous rock, which serves to "seal-in" oil and gas and thereby
separate it from other groundwater aquifers. 24 In addition, deeper
groundwater aquifers located in or near the formations that contain conventional oil and gas, are less likely to be hydraulically connected to
tributary surface water merely as a result of their depths.25 Moreover,
even if these deep aquifers are hydraulically connected, water at such a
depth is likely to satisfy Colorado's statutory definition of nontributary
groundwater, which requires that the groundwater "withdrawal . . . will

not, within one hundred years of continuous withdrawal, deplete the flow
of a natural stream . . . at an annual rate greater than one-tenth of one

percent of the annual rate of withdrawal." 26 Due to this deep groundwater's slow migration speeds, on average about a foot per day, it is more

22. See Edwin D. Gutentag, et al., Geohydrology of the High Plains Aquifer in Parts
of Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahona, South Dakota, Texas and
Wyoming: U.S. Geological Survey PifessionalPaper,1400-B, High Plains RASA Project, availableathttp://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/1400b/report.pdf.
23. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, NATURAL GAS: SCHEMATIC
GEOLOGY OF NATURAL GAS RESOURCES, (Jan. 27, 2010) available at
http://www.eia.gov/oilgas/natural-gas/special/ngresources/ngresources.html.
24. Id.
25. See Gutentag, supra note 23.
26. COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103 (10.5) (2010).
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likely that the statute will deem the water produced during conventional
development "nontributary." 27
Conventional development is also different from CBM because the
removal of groundwater is not inextricably tied to the extraction process. 28 Unlike CBM production, oil and gas is extracted by drilling a well
into an oil or gas bearing formation, and relying on the natural pressure
of the oil or gas at depth to push the oil or gas to the surface. 29 In conventional development, water removal is not necessary for production
and is only produced in large quantities towards the end of the life of the
well. 3 0
A.

VANCE V. WOLFE

In Vance, two ranching families, the Fitzgeralds and the Vances (referred to collectively as "Ranchers"), brought a declaratory judgment action in Colorado District Court, Water Division 7 ("water court") to determine the legal obligations of the SEO and the Division 7 Engineer for
well permits and augmentation plans associated with water produced during CBM operations." The Ranchers wanted CBM wells to be subject to
permitting administration by the SEO and argued that the withdrawal of
groundwater during CBM extraction constituted a beneficial use of that
water under the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969 ("1969 Act") and Colorado Ground Water Management Act
("GWA").32 The Ranchers were concerned that the SEO's abdication of
this obligation resulted in harm to their senior water rights.33 The water
court agreed with the Ranchers that CBM extraction constituted a beneficial use of groundwater and the extraction by CBM producers was an out
of priority withdrawal. 34 Defendants appealed the water court's finding of
beneficial use to the Colorado Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme
Court upheld the water court's decision, agreeing with the Ranchers, and
Vance v. Wolfe quickly became another of a long history of hotly debated water cases.3
The Appellants, the SEO and BP America Production Company
("Appellants") presented a three-pronged argument in their appeal.36
Appellants first argued that water produced during CBM extraction was
27.

R. W Buddemier & J. A. Schloss, Groundwater Storage and Flow,

KANSAS

GEOLOGICAL SUR vEY (2000)available at

http://www.kgs.ku.edu/HighPlains/atlas/apgengw.htm.
28. Evers, supra note 14.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Vance, 205 P.3d at 1166-67.
32. CoLo. REV. STAT. S 37-92-502; COLO. REV. STAT.
at 1166-67.
33. Vance, 205 P.3d at 1166-67.
34. Id.
35. Vance, 205 P.3d at 1167.
36. Id. at 1166-68.

S

37-90-137; Vance, 205 P.3d
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actually "produced water" and therefore a mere waste product incidental
to the actual goal of mining for methane.17 Appellants argued that with
no intent to put water to beneficial use, the withdrawal of such water
would not trigger either the 1969 Act or GWA." In response, Ranchers
argued that because extracting the methane required the withdrawal of
water, and because water is instrumental in keeping methane trapped in
coal seams, the extraction of water constituted beneficial use.39
The Court agreed and held that the production of water was not an
incidental waste, but rather an essential component of producing methane gas; the Court further held that this beneficial use triggered the 1969
Act and the GWA.40 This "beneficial use" gave rise to appropriative
rights and required the SEO to prohibit out-of-priority withdrawals without an approved augmentation plan. 4' Relying on its past decisions regarding the beneficial use of water associated with gravel extraction, the
Court reasoned that the interpretation in those cases coupled with statutory construction resulted in the determination that the withdrawal of
groundwater in the CBM process was an "integral component" to the
CBM process, and thus a beneficial use.4 2
In Three Bells Ranch Assoc. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n
and Zigan Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n,
commonly referred to as the "gravel cases," the claims centered on the
question of whether the water collected in pits after the extraction of sand
and gravel constituted a beneficial.43 In the gravel cases, the Court held
that because the producers used the water collected in the pits for a later
beneficial use including land reclamation and dust suppression, that use
gave rise to an appropriative right.44 Hoping to distinguish the gravel
cases from the case at hand, Appellants in Vance argued that the fact that
the water was applied to a lateruse is what gave rise to the beneficial use,
where in CBM production, the contentious use happened at the time of
extraction.4 5 The Court disagreed, holding that the temporal difference
between finding beneficial use at the time of extraction in Vance rather
than the later use in the gravel cases was not relevant. 46
The Court discussed at length the fact that Colorado water law proceeds from the presumption that all groundwater is tributary unless
proven to be non-tributary and the parties in Vance did not challenge that
37. Id. at 1168.
38. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-502; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137.
39. Vance, 205 P3d at 1168.
40. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502; COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137.
41. Vance, 205 P3d at 1168.
42. Id. at 1170.
43. See generally, Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users
Ass'n, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo. 1988); Zigan Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cache La Poudre Water
Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1988).
44. Three Bells Ranch Assocs. 758 P.2d at 166; Zigan Sand & Gravel, Inc. 758 P.2d
181.
45. Vance, 205 P3d at 1170 (emphasis added).
46. Id.
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presumption.4 7 Pursuant to the 1969 Act, the state engineer has the affirmative duty to protect existing water rights against injury by curtailing
injurious out-of-priority diversions of tributary ground water that are not
48
replaced under an augmentation plan or substitute water supply plan.
If a court finds an "appropriation" and a "well" under the GWA and the
1969 Act, and the presumption of the tributariness of that water source is
not overcome, then the use of that water is subject to the priority system
to be administered by the SEO.49 In this case, the court did not need to
address whether the water was tributary because neither party contested
the presumption.5 0
The 1969 Act defines an "appropriation" as, "the application of a
specified portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use," and a
"well" as, "any structure or device used for the purpose of or with the
effect of obtaining ground water for a beneficial use from an aquifer.""
The fact that Appellants constructed CBM wells with the intent to extract
ground water was also uncontested; the definition of "well" and "appropriation" thus hinged on whether the use of the extracted water was a
"beneficial use."52 Had the court found that the use was a beneficial use
but that the water was not tributary, the SEO would still have had to assert its jurisdiction over the water. 53 The burden of this intervention
would be less onerous however, because the producer's use of the water
would not give rise to an appropriative right that could trigger a costly
5 4
augmentation plan if the stream-system was already over-appropriated.
Rather, because the GWA does not require nontributary water to be administered under the priority system, the Appellants would simply need
55
to obtain a permit from the SEO in order to conduct CBM operations.
After holding that the extraction of water in CBM mining constituted a
"beneficial use" of that water, the court next addressed the SEO's two
remaining arguments.
Appellants next argued that, as an administrative agency, the SEO was
entitled to deference in its definition of beneficial use because the term
was ambiguous. 6 The court disagreed, holding that the SEO's determination that extraction of water during CBM development did not constitute beneficial use was contrary to the plain meaning of the 1969 Act and
therefore unreasonable." The 1969 Act defines "beneficial use" as, "the
use of that amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to accomplish without waste the purpose for
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1168.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-502.
Vance, 205 P.3d at 1168-69.

50.

Id.

51.
52.

COLo. REv. STAT. S 37-93-103(3)(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-93-103(14)(a).
Vance, 205 P.3d at 1169.

53.
54.

Id. at 1171.
Id.

55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 1172.

57.

Id.

-
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which the appropriation is lawfully made.",5 While this is a broad and
ambiguous definition of the term, and acknowledging that the SEO was
entitled to some deference, the court nevertheless held that the SEO's
claim that water produced during CBM development did not fall within
the definition conflicted with the plain meaning of the statute.
Third, Appellants argued that the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC") had exclusive regulatory authority over
water produced during CBM extraction. 60 To support their argument,
Appellants offered evidence that the COGCC had been granted broad
regulatory authority.' While it acknowledged the powers granted to the
COGCC, the court ultimately held that the COGCC did not have exclusive regulatory authority because Appellants failed to produce evidence of
a specific provision of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act that exempted
oil and gas production from the 1969 Act or the GWA.62 Because of the
absence of such evidence, the court held that the appellant's argument
was in direct conflict with the plain language of the Ground Water Act
Accordingly, the court interpreted the language of
and the 1969 Act.
the 1969 Act and the GWA to hold that water produced by appellant's
CBM wells constituted beneficial use, did not overcome the presumption
of tributariness, and gave rise to an appropriative right.6
By holding that water produced during CBM development constituted a beneficial use, the court surprised the oil and gas industry by
demonstrating that they did not have an exemption for their groundwater
withdrawals. The court also emphasized that when making the determination, the issue was very fact specific. Finally, its extensive examination
of the presumption that all groundwater is tributary seemed to hint to the
Legislature that this would be the next step in the incorporation of water
law into oil and gas development.
B.

THE AFTERMATH OF VANCE

The Vance decision triggered powerful reactions from both the water
and oil and gas communities, and led the Legislature and SEO to take
action. Many analysts were quick to extrapolate from the decision its
application to the oil and gas industry as a whole." Many also wondered
if conventional oil and gas wells would now be administered under the

58.
59.

CoLo. REv. STAT. S 37-92-502.
Vance, 205 P.3d at 1172.

60.

Id.

61.
62.
63.

Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id.

64.

Id. at 1171.

65. See Ken Wonstolen, Vance Decision Throws Oil and Gas Into Uncharted Waters, ENERGY NEWs ALERT, Beatty & Wozniak, P.C. (2009) available at
http://www.bwenergylaw.com/News/docunents/VanceDecisionThrowsOilandGasIntoUn
chartedWaters.pdf.
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prior appropriation system. 66 The oil and gas industry argued that forcing producers to buy water rights or adjudicate costly augmentation plans
could make drilling in Colorado prohibitively expensive for producers.6 7
The existence of the presumption of tributariness only served to
strengthen the oil and gas industry's trepidation.6 ' As a result of these
concerns, and anticipating the increased burden that regulating groundwater produced during oil and gas development would place on the SEO,
the Legislature began reacting to Vance even before the decision was
handed down by proposing House Bill 1303, which passed just days after
the court issued its opinion in Vance.6 9 The Legislature attempted not
only to create an efficient framework for the SEO, but also incorporate
the court's ruling about the beneficial use of water produced during CBM
development.
C.

HOUSE BILL 09-1303 AND SENATE BILL 165

Recognizing both that CBM development is unique and that Vance
necessitated a comprehensive framework for dealing with water issues in
oil and gas development, the Legislature passed several bills to streamline
the administration of CBM wells and extend the SEO's authority to all oil
and gas wells.7 0 The Legislature first adopted House Bill 09-1303 ("HB
09-1303"), which created specific timelines for when producers are expected to acquire permits and augmentation plans for tributary wells, and
granted the SEO authority to administer7 1the withdrawal of nontributary
groundwater for oil and gas development. 72
The Legislature also adopted Senate Bill 165, which amended COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-90-137 to address the Vance decision and provide
guidelines for the State engineer to determine when a permit is not required." These guidelines are codified in § 37-90-137(7) and state that
no permit is required for nontributary groundwater produced in oil and
gas development, with the exception of CBM development, if the water is
not beneficially used.7 4 The statute further states that nontributary water
produced in oil and gas development, excluding CBM-produced water, is
not beneficially used if it is extracted for the purpose of facilitating oil
and gas production and it is disposed of in the same geologic basin from

66.
67.
68.

Mosely, supra note 18 at *4-5.
Doig, supra note 2, at 173-4.

Vance v. Wolfe Case Summary, HOLLAND & HART LLP: WESTERN WATER
LAw, available at www.westernwaterlaw.com/Vance v_Wolfe.html.

69. 2009 CO H.B. 1303.
70. Produced Nontributary Ground Water Rules, 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 402-17,
Statement of Basis and Purpose.
COLo. REv. STAT. § 37-90-137(7)(c).
71.
H.B. 09-1303: Admin Mineral Development Water Wells, COYOTECULCH (Apr.
72.
28, 2009) available at http://coyotegulch.wordpress.com/2009/04/28/hb-09-1303-adminineral-(evelopment-water-wells-3/.
73. 2010 CO S.B. 165.
74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(7).
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which it was removed." The Bill goes on to require that this disposal
comply with all other relevant statutes and regulations and must be one of
the enumerated methods of dealing with the water. 76 Some of the enumerated methods include reinjection, road spreading, and reuse.n This
essentially means that nontributary water produced during oil and gas
development, other than CBM development, does not require a permit
as long as it is disposed of in the same basin from which it was taken in a
manner that satisfies one of the above-enumerated methods. Water produced during CBM development is considered beneficially used at extraction and thus requires a permit for the withdrawal of nontributary
water.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137, as amended by the two bills discussed above, also provides for review under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act of the SEO's determination as to whether energy producers need a permit. The combination of HB 09-1303 and Senate Bill
165 thus created a framework for the SEO to administer groundwater
produced during oil and gas development that both acknowledges the
differences between CBM extraction and other forms of oil and gas development, and allows for the integration of water law into the oil and gas
regulatory scheme (refer to Figure 1.0 for a chart that explains this
framework). These two actions by the Legislature allowed it to create an
exception for conventional development that produces nontributary water.7 9 This exception is justified by the complex hydrology and geology
associated with oil and gas development in Colorado and speaks to the
true concerns of water right holders.
Water right owners are inevitably concerned with oil and gas development harming the quality and quantity of their water supplies.
Whether the water produced as a result of energy production is a "beneficial use" of that water does not necessarily speak to this concern. The
Legislature's focus on the "tributary"/"nontributary" distinction effectively
addresses their concerns in that nontributary ground water will, by definition, not impact the water rights holders on surrounding streams, where
withdrawals of tributary groundwater will impact these water rights holders.8 0 Had the Legislature acted, as industry feared it would, and defined
beneficial use as any water extracted to facilitate oil and gas production,
the SEO may have needed to administer water rights for groundwater
produced more than a mile below the surface that was in no way hydrau-

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Amy Mowry & Ken Wonstolen, Vance v. Wolfe Adds Water Considerationsfor
Colorado Oil and Gas Producers, DENVER AssoCIATION OF PETROLEUM LAWMEN
NEWSLETrER (Oct. 2009) available at
http://www.cobar.org/repository/Inside Bar/Water962OLaw/November%2012,%202009/
Produced%20Water%20Article%2000 132482_.pdf.
80. COLo. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103.

1ssue 2

CASE NOTES

479

This could conlically connected to water used by water right owners.
siderably increase the cost of oil and gas development without protecting
water right users. 82 Therefore, in fully addressing the produced water
issue by regulating only tributary groundwater in conventional development, the Legislature created a functional exception that allayed the fears
of the oil and gas industry while also protecting existing water rights.
In Vance, the debate did not revolve around whether or not the water
produced was tributary because the Court relied on the unrebutted presumption that all groundwater is tributary.83 During the water court evidentiary proceedings, plaintiffs submitted engineering reports indicating
that not only was the water tributary, but that the withdrawal of such water
by CBM producers constituted an injury to their senior water rights. 84
Therefore, the presumption. that groundwater was tributary was supported by facts in the Vance. Moreover, such a presumption generally
applies to CBM wells, because CBM production regularly occurs at shallower depths.85 But conventional oil and gas producers argue that the
same facts are not likely to apply for most conventional wells.86
D.

STATE ENGINEER'S "PRODUCED NONTRIBUTARY GROUNDWATER
RULES"

Under its delegated authority to administer groundwater produced
during oil and gas development, the SEO promulgated the "Produced
Nontributary Ground Water Rules" ("Rulemaking" and "Rules," respectively).8 1 The Rules acknowledged the rebuttable presumption that all
groundwater is tributary, and the difficulty of a case-by-case determination for the thousands of oil and gas wells already in existence in Colorado." Thus, the SEO determined by rule, that certain geologic formations within the State were nontributary, thereby avoiding the necessity of
conventional producers to rebut that presumption for each individual
well operating in certain formations.89
During the Rulemaking, the SEO reviewed evidence from many interested parties including complex modeling, to determine areas where
the water produced by oil and gas wells is nontributary for purposes of
the SEO's administration of such water.90 If the water in the oil and gasproducing formation satisfied the statutory definition of nontributary, the
formation was officially delineated as nontributary in a Basin Specific

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Doig, supra note 2 at 176.
Vance, 205 P.3d at 1168.
Mowry, supra note 78.
Id.
Evers, supra note 14.
Produced Nontributary Ground Water Rules, supra note 70.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Rule." This means conventional oil and gas producers would not need
to obtain a permit in such delineated basins provided the water was not
beneficially used in accordance with COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(7).
See Figure 3.0 for the list of basins delineated as nontributary by the Basin Specific Rules.
Basin/Field

Formation (Name)

(Name)

Rule Dictating

Area Designated As

Nontributary

Nontributary

Designation

Piceance
Basin

Mesaverde Formation

Neslen
Formation

Rule 17.7.D.1

4.

4

4

4

Shallow
Formations

Weber
Formation
Morrison and Entrada
Sundance
Formations

91.

Id.

Cameo and South Cmyon Coal Groups (in the
Muddy Creek Drainage
North of Paonia Reservoir in Delta and Gunnison Counties)
All Neslen Formation
within Piceance Basin in
Garfield and Rio Blanco
Counties
Undifferentiated Wasatch Formation, middle
and lower Wasatch
Formation, Iles Formation of the Mesaverde
Group, Williams Fork
Formation of the Mesaverde Group, and undifferentiated Mesaverde
Group, within certain
delineated areas in Rio
Blanco, Garfield, Mesa,
Delta, and Pitkin Counties.
Rangely Oil Field in Rio
Blanco County
Wilson Creek Oil Field
in Rio Blanco County

Issue 2
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Basin/Field
(Name)

Formation (Name)

Northern
San Juan
Basin

Fruitland
Formation
A Pictured Cliff,
Cliff House,
Menefee, Point
Lookout, and
Dakota
Formations

Paradox
Basin

Paradox
Formation

Rule Dictating
Nontributary

4f81

Area Designated As
Nontributary

Designation

Rule 17.7.D.2

All Fruitland Formation
Within delineated areas
in Southwestern Colorado

Hovenweep Shale,
Gothic Shale, and Desert Creek Members
within Mesa, Montrose,
San Miguel, Dolores,
and Montezuma Counties

Sand Wash
Basin

DenverJulesburg
Basin

From Fort Union
Formation, Lance
Formation, Lewis
Shale, Meseverde
Group, Baxter
Shale, Frontier
Formation
Wasatch

Mowry Shale, Dakota
Sandstone, Nugget Sandstone, and Hiawatha
Member of the main
body of the Wasatch
Formation in Moffat
County.
Hiawatha and West

Formation

Hiawatha Gas Fields
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The state engineer's ability to conduct this analysis on a basin wide
level rather than-on a well-by-well basis streamlined the process and will
likely reduce the considerable cost and time associated with conducting
with well-by-well determinations. The Rules also created a process for
administrative appeal and provide for appellate review of the SEO's determinations of groundwater produced by energy developers by the water
court and ultimately the Colorado Supreme Court.93
E.

HOUSE BILL 1286

Recognizing that the Rules promoted efficiencies in the permitting
process, the Colorado Legislature passed House Bill 1286 ("Bill") in order to clarify and strengthen the SEO's position with regards to the
Rules. 94 The Bill clarified that the SEO had the specific authority to determine groundwater basins as tributary or nontributary. 95 Further, the
Bill granted the SEQ both rulemaking and adjudicatory authority to adOf relevance is the fact that the Legislature enminister this process.
acted the Bill while the Pawnee Well Users v. Wolfe case (discussed in
detail below) was pending.
1. Pawnee Well Users v. Wolfe
The SEO adopted the Final Rules in December 2009 and the BasinSpecific Rules were incorporated in early 2010.97 On March 1, 2010, a
group of water users and water right holders including the plaintiffs in
Vance, filed complaints in water divisions 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7, which were
consolidated into one proceeding in Colorado District Court, Water Division No. 1 ("water court"), captioned Pawnee Well Uses v. Wolfe.98 In
their complaint, plaintiffs challenged the Final Rules and the BasinSpecific Rules, claiming that the SEO exceeded its statutory authority and
that there was insufficient public notice of the rulemaking and related
procedures. 99
The water court reviewed both sets of rules using the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard specified in the Colorado Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA"), which provides that a court will defer to an agency decision
unless the agency's actions were arbitrary and capricious. 0 To be found
arbitrary or capricious, the agency action must deny a statutory right,
commit an action contrary to a constitutional right, exceed statutory jurisdiction, or commit an action that is clearly erroneous on the facts of the

93.
94.
95.
96..
97.
98.
99.

100.

Produced Nontributary Ground Water Rules, supra note 70.
2011 CO H.B. 1286.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Pawnee Well Users at *3.
Id. at *4.
COLo. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106.
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whole record.'o' If the agency's action is not arbitrary or capricious, the
water court will defer to the agency and uphold the agency's decision.' 02
This deference is premised on the idea that agencies are the entities best
equipped to interpret statutes directed at them.'03 Courts are reluctant to
impose their own interpretation of statutes over an agency's interpretation
of its statutory authority.'0 The APA, therefore, instructs courts to defer
to agency discretion except in the enumerated instances.'0 5
Plaintiffs' primary argument consisted of three parts. First, plaintiffs
argued that the SEO did not have the rulemaking authority to make general basin wide determinations as to whether the groundwater being produced was tributary or nontributary in lieu of conducting a traditional
well-by-well analysis because House Bill 1303 and Senate Bill 165 only
granted the SEO the authority over water produced during energy development, rather than entire basins.o' Second, plaintiffs argued that the
SEO did not have the statutory authority to conduct adjudications that
make nontributary determinations.'o7 Third, plaintiffs argued that the
SEO did not have the authority to make determinations in areas where
there is currently no oil and gas development.0 s Concerning the first
part of plaintiffs primary argument, the water court held that COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-90-137(7)(c) as amended by House Bill 1303 expressly
granted the SEO authority to adopt rules to assist in administering
groundwater because to hold otherwise would render subsection
137(7)(c) superfluous.'0 o
Turning to the second part of plaintiffs main argument, the water
court held that notwithstanding its acknowledgment that House Bill 1303
and Senate Bill 165 did not granted the SEO the explicit authority to
conduct adjudications, the water court held that the legislation granted
the state engineer "implied and incidental" powers to effectuate the legislative mandate and that these implied powers included adjudications."o
Further, when the Legislature passed House Bill 1286, it made both the
SEO's authority to delineate entire basins and its adjudicatory authority
explicit."' Accordingly, the water court held that the SEO had the implied power to adjudicate claims associated with such delineations.
The water court then addressed plaintiffs' third claim that the SEO
lacked authority to make nontributary determinations in areas where
there are no current or proposed oil and gas wells because COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-90-103(10.5) requires that nontributary determinations be

110.
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made on existing aquifer conditions the time of permitting, and not before.Il 2 The water court found that §103(10.5) does not specifically conflict with § 137(7)(c) because the SEO could conduct further analysis at
the time a permit is sought as required by S 103(10.5) and yet still designate the basin earlier pursuant to § 137(7)(c)."'
The water court next addressed plaintiffs' claims that they did not receive sufficient due process under the U.S. and Colorado constitutions
and the APA. Analyzing the U.S. and Colorado procedural due process
claims, the water court applied the three-part Olson test. 114 The test
states that a court must consider (i) whether a property right has been
identified; (ii) whether governmental action with respect to that propefty
amounts to a deprivation; and (iii) whether the deprivation, if one is
found, occurred without due process of law."' The fact that the plaintiffs
were water right owners easily satisfied the first part of the test because
water rights are property rights." 6 The water court held, however, that
part (ii) was not satisfied because plaintiffs were not sufficiently able to
prove that the SEO's actions actually deprived them of a right." 7 Rather,
the water court found that any deprivation would be merely incidental
because not injury yet existed, and would only result upon the SEO's
potential erroneous determination at some point in the future." 8 Therefore, the water court held that the Plaintiffs had sufficient procedural due
process under both the U.S. and Colorado constitutions." 9
Plaintiffs next claimed that the SEO's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("Notice") was not consistent with the subject matter of the notice and
therefore the Rules should be overturned for lack of procedural due
process.120 Had plaintiffs succeed on this claim, the Rules would have
been overturned for lack of adequate procedural due process. However,

the water court found that, contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, the manner
in which the SEO promulgated the Rules provided sufficient notice because specific passages of the Notice mentioned that the rulemaking was
designed to "identify certain areas or formations with the State as nontributary or tributary."'21

In related APA claims, plaintiffs next asserted they were deprived of
procedural due process because they were not given sufficient time to

conduct cross-examination witnesses during the rulemaking proceedings.' 22 The water court disagreed because plaintiffs made no showing of
112. COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-90-103(10.5).
113. Pawnee Well Users at * 12.
114. Hillside Community Church v. Olson, 58 P.3d 1021, 1025 (Colo. 2002).
115. Id.
116. Pawnee Well Users, No. 10CW89WL at *14.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at *15.
120, Id.
121. Record at 23-24, Pawnee Well Users v. Wolfe, No. 1OCW89WL *1 (2011) (No.
2012SA13).
122, Pawnee Well Users, No. 1OCW89WL at *16.
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facts that they would have presented had they been given more time to
prepare.123 Finally, the water court denied plaintiffs claim that the SEO's
cost-benefit analysis was insufficient.124 In so doing, the water court
found that while the SEO presented a multitude of facts concerning the
cost-benefit analysis, plaintiffs articulated no specific facts for why the
cost-benefit analysis was insufficient.125
The water court next examined whether it could consider House Bill
1286 in determining whether the SEO exceeded its statutory authority.
Plaintiffs argued that because the Bill was enacted after the SEO initiated
the rulemaking, applying the legislation to grant*retroactive authority to
the SEO would be unconstitutionally retrospective because it could injure
owners of water rights.126 The water court underwent a three-step analysis. First, it looked at whether it could consider legislation enacted while
a case was pending. The water court quickly determined that it could as
long as the legislation was not retrospective. Second, the water court determined that the 1286 was not retroactive because it merely clarified the
authority granted in House Bill 1303. In reaching this conclusion, the
water court began with the rebuttable presumption that when the Legislature amends a statute, it intends to change the law and as such, is retroactive. 12 This presumption can be rebutted with evidence that the Legislature merely intended to clarify the law and not create a new law.' 28 In
making this determination, the water court applied the three-part Academy of CharterSchools Test, which examines (i) whether the statute was
ambiguous before it was amended; (ii) the plain language of the amendment; and (iii) the legislative history of the amendment.129
As to the first part of the Academy of CharterSchools Test, the water
court held that House Bill 1303, the Bill House Bill 1286 sought to
amend, was ambiguous.' 30 Nowhere in Bill 1303 did it say how the SEO
could administer permits."' Had the bill been unambiguous, then House
Bill 1286 would be retroactive, and the water court would then need to
examine whether the legislation was also unconstitutionally retrospective. 132 However, because House Bill 1303 did not specify how the SEO
could administer permits, it was ambiguous and House Bill 1286 was
necessary to clarify 1303's ambiguity. 33 The water court also held that
the second part of the Academy of Charter Schools Test was satisfied
because the plain language of House Bill 1286 made clear that the Legis123.
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Id.

125. Id.
126. Id. at 16-17.
127. Id. at *17.
128. Id.
129. Acad. of Charter Schools v. Adadfis County School Dist. No. 12, 32 P.2d 119,
125 (Colo. 1995).
130. Pawnee Well Users at* 18.
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lature's intent in passing the Bill was to delegate authority to the SEO to
make nontributary designations as well as to conduct adjudications concerning these designations. 134 Finally, the water court held that the legislative history also supported this finding.'3 ' Thus the court held that
House Bill 1286 was not new legislation, but merely clarified House Bill
1303."

Third, notwithstanding its holding that HB 1286 was not retroactive,
the water court held that even if HB 1286 was retroactive, it was not unconstitutional because it was not retrospective. Retroactive legislation is
only unconstitutional if it is retrospective.' 3 7 Retrospective legislation is
legislation that both applies retroactively and divests an individual of a
vested right.'38 The water court held that none of the plaintiffs had been
deprived of a vested right because the right they asserted was a right to an
administrative rulemaking process, which is only an inchoate right."'
Because this right was only inchoate, rather than vested the bill was not
retrospective and was therefore constitutional.140 Thus the water court
held that HB 1286 was not retroactive because it merely intended to clarify the statute, and even if it was retroactive, it was not unconstitutionally
retrospective because it only divested individuals of an inchoate rather
than vested right.' 4'
The water court then examined the validity SEO's "Fruitland Rule"
("FR"). The FR delineated a groundwater basin called the "Fruitland
Formation" situated beneath the Southern Ute Reservation as nontributary.142 However the SEO, in a stipulation with the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe, declined to decide whether he had jurisdiction to administer nontributary water originating on the reservation, codified in the Rules under
17.3.F.14 3 Analyzing the FR and 17.3.F ("Tribe Rule"), the water court
held that the State engineer could not promulgate a rule for an area
where his jurisdiction had not been established and overturned the FR.144
The Tribe Rule establish that the Rules shall not be construed to establish the jurisdiction of any party.145 Therefore, the water court held that,
because the SEO could not determine its jurisdiction, the determination
that the Fruitland Formation was nontributary constituted an advisory
opinion under the Rules, which the SEO did not have authority to make

134. Id.
135. Sonnenberg Testimony before the House Agriculture Committee discussion of
HB 1286, March 21, 2011.
136. Pawnee Well Users at *20.
137. Id. at *19.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.at * 17-20.
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under the APA.146 At the time of this writing, the SEO is appealing the
47
water court's holding on this issue to the Colorado Supreme Court.'
Finally, the water court looked at the legal effect of the rules. Plaintiffs argued that the SEO's determinations regarding the tributary nature
of the water should have no effect in water court proceedings, unless
C.R.S. § 37-92-305(6) applies.'4 8 This statute gives the SEO explicit au49
thority to make binding legal decisions regarding permitting of wells.'
However, it does not grant the SEO authority to make basin-wide decisions.15 The water court held that the SEO's basin-wide determinations
did not have any independent legal effect, but were limited to the SEO's
duties to administer the dewatering of geological formations by facilitating
or permitting the mining of minerals pursuant to pursuant C.R.S. § 3790-137(7)."' Further, the water court found that the SEO's determinations were afforded the rebuttable presumption of validity. This ultiinately means that a water court is not restrained from determining the
tributary nature of the water if an oil and gas producer seeks to adjudicate
its rights to this water, but the SEO's determination is given significant
weight.
The ultimate effect of Pawnee is that the SEO has the authority to
make basin-wide, nontributary groundwater determinations to facilitate
the administration of groundwater associated with the mining of minerals.
These determinations provide an exemption for a large number of nonCBM oil and gas wells to avoid the permitting process. The only portion
of the SEO Rules the water court overturned was the Fruitland Rule and
52
this is currently being appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.'

III.

FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The oil and gas industry was clearly worried about the potential result
of the Court's decision in Vance and therefore sought to calm their fears
in the Legislature even before they were sure about the end result in
Vance. The actions of the Legislature and the upholding of the SEO's
Rules in Pawnee do much to allay the fears of oil and gas producers.
The Legislature and SEO have built on the Vance decision by both regulating gas development in Colorado and by carving out an exception for
conventional development by specifically defining what does not constitute beneficial use and by conducting complex, basin-by-basin analysis of
groundwater formations. While an increase in litigation and permitting
costs to oil and gas producers in the State seems inevitable after these
146.

Id.

147. Colorado State Engineer's Notice of Appeal from the Water Court Review of an
Agency Action at *2, Pawnee Well Users v. Wolfe, No. 1OCW89WL *1 (2011) (No.
2012SA13).
148. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(6).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Pawnee Well Users at *23.
152. No. 2012SA13 supra note 147.
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rules are implemented, these costs are not likely to be nearly as damaging
to the industry as feared after the Vance decision.
These rules also created a legal distinction between CBM development, which is far more likely to affect tributary water supplies, and other
forms of oil and gas development. By requiring that the SEO administer
groundwater produced during oil and gas development, the Vance decision added significantly to the workload of the SEO. But the Legislature's actions reduced this burden when it worked closely with the SEO
to create a streamlined regulatory framework. Thus, it is likely that oil
and gas industry will not see the catastrophic cost increases it feared
would occur after Vance. Further, now water rights owners have added
legal protections over their groundwater rights.
Finally, the Legislature's recent decisions and actions have raised
questions concerning the ownership of nontributary groundwater. Under
Colorado law, landowners own the nontributary water beneath their land,
as opposed to tributary groundwater, which is a separate right subject to
the prior appropriations doctrine. Does this distinction give landowners
more control over oil and gas development on their land in areas that are
delineated as nontributary or less? Will this force more producers to
deal directly with landowners in addition to regulatory agencies? Only
time will tell.

